The paper considers an imitation dynamic in the context of Cournot oligopoly. The pure "imitate-the-best" behavior can lead to an outcome inconsistent with Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The paper extends purely imitative behavior to imperfect imitation in the two-stage model with capacities and prices. This variation in the imitative behavior improves efficiency and makes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium a possible outcome of the dynamic imitation process.
Introduction
This paper deals with imitative behavior. When facing a common decision problem individuals sometimes can see what others have done in the same situation as they are in, and imitate their actions. Clearly, observations of others give some valuable information without incurring the cost of experimentation. Thus, one can learn via mistakes of others rather than via own mistakes. Still, the extra information should be handled with care. If imitation is too fast, a lock-in in an inferior action is possible. Banerjee (1992) considers a model with imperfect information that can lead (rationally!) to the selection of a non-optimal action. On the other hand, examples of boundedly rational sequential decision making with imitation that may lead to the efficient action are given in Fudenberg (1993, 1995) . The question in decision problems is not whether to imitate but rather how to imitate (see also Schlag, 1998) .
Imitation can occur in games too. Players want to improve their performance, therefore if they observe a payoff higher than their own they might be tempted to imitate the strategy bringing this higher payoff. Doing so may actually decrease their own payoff but at the moment of making the decision the players might not realize it. One justification can be that players do not know that they are playing a game, or they do not understand the complex interdependence of their actions. Thus, they may use the same behavioral rule as in decision problems. Imitation can be useful if the environment changes rapidly, as argued in Rhode and Stegeman (2001) . There is some experimental support for imitative behavior in games, including Cournot oligopoly models, nicely presented in Huck et al. (1999) . Another justification of imitative behavior in games is that players are concerned about relative payoffs. Such an interpretation of imitation appears, for example, in Schaffer (1989) .
In games interaction and imitation may occur in the same population. For example, firms in an industry can be competing with each other and at the same time be interested in each other's market strategy so that a successful firm might be imitated by others. Imitation does not imply that everybody will be better off in the end; on the contrary, the results might be very inefficient for the firms as in the Cournot oligopoly model of Vega-Redondo (1997) .
In general, non-strategic behavior, such as imitation, may or may not lead to the outcome that would have appeared had the behavior been strategic. The main question of this paper is whether this would happen for a game that has an oligopoly structure. The model of imitation follows closely the model of Vega-Redondo (1997) . He shows that in Cournot oligopoly the "imitate the best" dynamic converges to the Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium rather than to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We introduce a variation of the imitation process and the underlying game that makes the "as if" rational behavior represented by the Nash equilibrium possible. Gale and Rosenthal (1999) have a model of imitation in Cournot oligopoly that leads to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium but their result was due to the fact that imitators are imitating the aggregate action of the population, disregarding the comparison of payoffs to their current action and the new action. In contrast, we want to keep imitation of success as the behavioral rule.
The variation concerns imperfection in imitation. Imitation in real life can be imperfect, for example, when one observes only a part of the strategy of another player but not the whole strategy. The reason is that a strategy prescribes what to do in every contingency, but the players observe only the realized play. When trying to imitate a strategy, the absent parts of it are filled with something else. In games such a model is considered in the context of the repeated prisoners' dilemma game by Ruebeck (1999) . In this paper we extend the one-stage Cournot duopoly to the two-stage capacity-price game of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and we demonstrate that imperfect imitation gives some support to the Cournot-Nash outcome in the sense that it is a possible long run outcome of the dynamic process.
The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 presents the general model of imitation and experimentation and an example of Cournot oligopoly game. Section 3 extends the example to imperfect imitation in the two-stage game and Section 4 concludes.
The Model

The Perfect Imitation Dynamic
There are n agents in the population. They play a finite symmetric game G = (N, S, π), where |N | = n, S is the strategy set and π is the payoff function. The strategy set S of the game is assumed to be finite.
The dynamic process of imitation is in discrete time t = 1, 2, . . .. Agent i ∈ N is characterized at time t by the pure strategy s t i she plays in period t. The imitation process works as follows. In each period of time each player has the possibility to revise her strategy (if there is a probability τ < 1 (independent across players) of revising the strategy, the process slows down but the results do not change). To revise her strategy the player observes a signal about the payoffs and corresponding strategies of all other players. In the perfect imitation case the signal is exactly the payoffs and the strategies; in the imperfect imitation case the signal can change or suppress some information.
Denote by
) the information that is available to the players at the end of period t in the perfect imitation case. Player i finds the maximal payoff in the information set I t and then copies the corresponding strategy. That is,
If there are several strategies that give the maximal payoff, one of them is chosen randomly according to a probability distribution with full support on the set of strategies giving this highest payoff. This kind of imitation is called "imitate the best", since only the highest payoff in the sample is imitated. If the initial strategies s 1 i are given, the dynamic is fully specified. We call a population state monomorphic if all individuals play the same strategy. In such a state all individuals receive the same payoff since the game is symmetric. Observe that the imitation process alone cannot bring a new strategy into the population. Obviously, if the population is in a monomorphic state, it will stay there. Therefore, monomorphic states are stationary. Conversely, consider the case when there are several strategies in the population. Suppose two of the strategies bring different payoffs. Since each player observes all other players, the player with the lower payoff will imitate the player with the higher payoff. Therefore, such a state cannot be stationary. Alternatively, suppose that all present strategies bring the same payoff. By the same reason as above, and by the fact that any of the strategies that bring the maximal payoff is imitated with a positive probability, there is a non-zero probability that players with different strategies will switch to the same strategy. This will reduce the number of strategies present. Thus the only stationary state of this sort is the one where all agents play the same strategy. In order to analyze which stationary states are more stable against small perturbations, the possibility of experimentation is introduced. In each period each player has an independent probability λ of experimentation, that is, a player can switch to a strategy that is not necessarily found by the imitation procedure. The probability distribution over strategies resulting from experimentation will be taken to be uniform across strategies for each player though any not very extreme (in the sense that for any two strategies the ratio of probabilities that the strategies are the result of experimentation remains bounded as λ → 0) probability distribution will do. The combined process of imitation and experimentation defines a Markov chain on the space of states of the population. The Markov chain is ergodic and has a unique stationary distribution µ(λ) over states. We are interested in the case when the probability of experimentation is arbitrarily small, that is, we consider lim λ→0 µ(λ). This limit will be called the limit stationary distribution.
Definition 1 A state is stochastically stable if it has a non-zero weight in the limit stationary distribution.
Since the process is ergodic, the weights in the limit stationary distribution correspond to the proportion of time the process spends in each stochastically stable state in the long run, independently of the initial conditions. Thus, if the limit stationary distribution puts a non-zero weight on a state, this state is observed some non-negligible proportion of the time in the long run. A stochastically stable state will be also called a long-run outcome of the process.
Notice that we require very little rationality from the players. First, they do not suspect that they are playing a game; they simply copy actions of others. Second, they condition their behavior only on the last period observation, that is, they have a one-period memory. These boundaries on rationality of the players are not uncommon in the literature. For example, Schlag (1998) analyzes behavioral rules in one-player decision problems where players are allowed to use information only about the last period play of oneself and one other individual. He shows that in the class of such models only imitative models never decrease the expected payoff. Our model is an extension of the model of Vega-Redondo (1997) where players could imitate perfectly in the setup of Cournot oligopoly. The aim of this paper is to show that even with little rationality the players can achieve "as if" rational behavior in this setup. Alós-Ferrer (2001) extends the model of Vega-Redondo (1997) in the direction of more rationality by allowing players to have a larger memory.
The simplest example of the process described above is a population of two agents (thus n = 2). In this case the long-run outcome of the imitation process is influenced by relative rather than absolute payoffs (Shubik, 1982 , was one of the first to notice this; see also Schaffer, 1989) . How exactly the outcome depends on relative payoffs in general games is not clear; in section 3 we present an example showing that the set of stochastically stable states does not necessarily coincide with the set of Nash equilibria of the relative payoff game.
In what follows we consider the imitation and experimentation dynamic in symmetric Cournot oligopoly type games with a unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium. The main question is to what state the imitation and experimentation dynamic converges in the long run in such games.
The Cournot Oligopoly Example
One of the results in the class of imitation models described above is due to Vega-Redondo (1997), who shows that the process converges to the non-Nash Walrasian outcome in Cournot oligopoly.
Consider an industry with n identical firms all competing with each other. There are no capacity constraints on production. Denote by q i ≥ 0 the output of firm i and by Q the aggregate output. The demand side is given by the twice differentiable decreasing demand function D(p) that is concave. The inverse demand function is denoted by P (Q) := D −1 (Q), and is decreasing and concave too. Production is costly. The twice differentiable increasing cost function C(q) is assumed to be convex and
For our purposes we need to define the Walrasian and Cournot production levels since they play a particular role in the analysis.
Definition 2
The Walrasian (competitive) production level q W is the production level such that it maximizes profit taking price as given,
Alternatively, the Walrasian production level is such that price equals marginal cost, P (nq W ) = C (q W ).
Definition 3
The Cournot (Nash) production level q N is the production level in the symmetric Nash equilibrium,
Given the assumptions above, the Walrasian and the Cournot equilibria exist and are unique. The Walrasian output level is higher than the Cournot output level.
To bring the setup under the general model considered above, assume that firms can choose quantities from a finite grid Γ q = {0, δ q , . . . , vδ q }. It is assumed that both the Walrasian output level and the Cournot equilibrium output level belong to the grid. The finite grid can be largely dispensed of, see Schenk-Hoppé (2000). We assume the finite set of strategies to avoid unnecessary technical difficulties.
The work of the imitation process is based on the fact that if some firms produce the Walrasian output level and other firms produce some other output level, the firms producing the Walrasian output have higher profit (VegaRedondo, 1997). This holds for any output level other than Walrasian one. The firms then imitate the firms with the Walrasian output. From any monomorphic state other than the Walrasian equilibrium one experimentation with q W is enough to upset the state, and to upset the state (q W , . . . , q W ), experimentation by one firm is not enough.
Proposition 1 (Vega-Redondo, 1997) The only long-run outcome of the imitation and experimentation dynamic for the Cournot oligopoly described above is the Walrasian equilibrium.
Thus, the long-run outcome of the process for Cournot oligopoly is not a Nash equilibrium of the game with absolute profits as payoffs. However, it is a Nash equilibrium of the game where instead of absolute profit relative profit is maximized (see Vega-Redondo, 1997). Though it is the case here that the outcome of the process coincides with a Nash equilibrium of the relative payoffs game, this does not always hold as we will demonstrate in the example in section 3.
The result of the imitation and experimentation dynamic in the simple Cournot oligopoly model is very inefficient for the firms. Profits in the Walrasian equilibrium are smaller than in the Nash equilibrium. If the firms simply imitate each other and occasionally experiment, in the long run they receive a smaller profit than in the one-shot Nash equilibrium. This comes from the fact that a deviation from the Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly hurts the competitors more than it hurts the deviator. This result also holds when a higher payoff is not always imitated. Schlag (1998) argues that proportional imitation, that is, when the probability of imitating is proportional to the difference in payoffs, is optimal (in the sense of payoff increasing in the next round for any decision problem) for a situation when agents play many copies of a decision problem. In our case proportional imitation slows down the process but does not change the long-run outcome since a strategy close to the Walrasian one gets imitated with a probability higher than the probability of imitating a strategy far from the competitive equilibrium.
Despite the inefficiency of the outcome in Cournot oligopoly, imitation does not seem to be an implausible behavioral rule. People do imitate in the real life and experiments (see Huck et al., 1999) . Is it possible to change the setting of the model so that the agents fare better? The next section builds on the model extending it in some dimensions. play and therefore they are not able to distinguish between the "always cooperate" and "tit-for-tat" strategies if there is no defection. To incorporate such a possibility into the oligopoly model, we extend the game to the twostage game of price competition with capacity precommitment, the model considered in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to justify Cournot competition.
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) consider a game where in the first stage two firms simultaneously choose capacities q i and in the second stage, after the capacities are known, they simultaneously choose prices p i . The assumptions on the demand and cost functions are the same as in section 2.2, but the cost is the cost of installed capacities and not of the actual production (which is now costless up to the capacity and it is impossible to produce more than the capacity). The rationing rule is efficient, that is, the consumers with higher valuations for the good buy from the cheapest supplier. The profit of firm i is Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that under certain mild conditions the choice of capacities and prices corresponding to the Cournot equilibrium of the onestage game is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game.
In each period the firms observe each others' actions and profits. In the two-stage game a firm can observe only the capacity of the other firm and the price announced by the other firm after both firms have chosen capacities, that is, a firm does not know what the other firm's prices are in response to other capacity choices. Therefore imitation is imperfect, that is, a firm can imitate just one price and one capacity it has observed. There are several different ways to model such a restriction. For example, the firms can keep intact their intended responses on capacity combinations different from the observed one. Alternatively, they can change all intended price choices to the one observed. We adopt the second way of modeling. Though it is quite a restriction on the rationality of the players, it requires the least memory to remember a strategy (only one price to remember instead of the whole vector of intended prices).
Formally, imitation in the two-stage game described above is modeled as follows. There are two firms, thus n = 2. In addition to the grid on quantities Γ q , the firms choose prices from a finite grid Γ p = {0, δ p , . . . , wδ p } such that ∀q ∈ Γ q Γ p P (2q) and ∀p ∈ Γ p Γ q
. Then Γ p contains prices that correspond to the Walrasian and Cournot equilibria. A (full) strategy of firm i in the normal form corresponding to the two-stage game in extensive form can be described by a ((v + 1) 2 + 1)-tuple specifying the capacity choice and the price choice for each combination of the capacities of the two firms. Denote such a strategy in period t by s
Thus, in distinction from the perfect imitation dynamic of the previous section, the information set of firm i is I By assumption, when imitating, firms change the capacity and all intended price choices to the one observed. Thus, if firm j's profit was larger, firm i's strategy in the next period will be s t+1 i = (q * j ; p * j , . . . , p * j ). Therefore, except possibly in a finite number of periods after each experimentation, a firm's strategy is completely described by just two variables, (q, p). This is equivalent to the situation when firms announce both capacity and price simultaneously. The original process of imperfect imitation in the two-stage game is reduced to perfect imitation in a simultaneous move one-stage game. Observe that this reduction comes from our assumption on the imitation process, not on the game itself.
Let us illustrate how the process works on a simple example with linear demand and cost functions and only two possible levels of capacities and of prices, corresponding to the Cournot-Nash and Walrasian competitive outcomes. Then each firm has four strategies. Denote them by (q N , p N ), (q N , p W ), , which does not change the structure, the game has the following form:
The pure (without experimentation) imitative process has four stationary states on the diagonal of the bimatrix. Now let us introduce experimentation. Consider the Cournot-Nash stationary state in which both firms play (q N , p N ). Experimentation with (q N , p W ) or (q W , p N ) cannot bring a higher profit than that of the firm that does not experiment. If a > 4c, experimentation with (q W , p W ) cannot bring a higher payoff either. All other stationary states are upset by experimentation with (q N , p N ) by one firm. Therefore, if a > 4c, the Cournot-Nash outcome has weight one in the limit stationary distribution and is played in the long run.
If a ≤ 4c, both the Cournot (q N , p N ) and the competitive (q W , p W ) outcomes are Nash equilibria of the game above. Experimentation by one firm is enough to upset any of the stationary states, for example (q N , p N ) is upset by one firm moving to (q W , p W ). The state (q W , p W ) itself is upset by one firm experimenting with (q N , p W ). We need to show that the Cournot-Nash outcome can be achieved from other stationary states with a sequence of unilateral experimentations. Using the techniques introduced to evolutionary game theory by Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) , which are described in Appendix A, we can show that the Cournot-Nash outcome has a non-zero probability in the limit stationary distribution in the game above. For this game, the limit stationary distribution puts weights 1 4 , 1 4 , 0, 1 2 on stationary states ((q N , p N ), (q N , p W ), (q W , p N ) , (q W , p W )) respectively. In the general case, a similar reasoning gives Proposition 2 In the model of imitation and experimentation described above the limit stationary distribution puts a non-zero probability on the CournotNash outcome if the grids Γ q and Γ p are fine enough.
The formal proof is in Appendix A. Notice that in the example above the Walrasian outcome also has a strong position in the limit stationary distribution. In general, if the grid is fine enough, it has a non-zero weight too, since, unless the process is already in the Walrasian equilibrium where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, it is always possible to slightly undercut the other firm in price and to expand capacity so that the deviating firm's profit does not change but the remaining firm's demand decreases thus its profit decreases. The remaining firm is then forced to follow the deviation.
There are other states of the process that are stochastically stable. Any state (q, p) that has the property that a firm playing (q, p) has a higher or equal profit than a firm playing (q N , p N ) is stochastically stable. Such states lie above the q =
. Since the Walrasian outcome is also stochastically stable, states that have the property that a firm in such a state has a higher or equal profit than a firm playing the Walrasian strategy, are long run outcomes too. Such states lie below the q =
line, that is, in such states q <
. In the example above, the state (q N , p W ) is such a state. For any price p between the Cournot-Nash and the competitive price there exists a set of capacity choices q such that (p, q) is stochastically stable. All such states belong to the unique locally stable component (i.e. the set of stationary states from which it is impossible to escape with only one mutation, see Appendix A for the formal definition) of the dynamical system. A similar result, at least in terms of quantities, is obtained in Alós-Ferrer (2001) , where the game is the ordinary Cournot oligopoly but firms have memory about profits and strategies not only from the last period, but also from the previous periods.
The two-stage game considered in this section gives also an answer to the question whether the imitation and experimentation dynamic always leads to the outcomes that are Nash equilibria of a game where absolute payoffs are replaced by relative payoffs (e.g. the difference between the absolute payoffs of the two players). Consider the example with two strategies, the Cournot-Nash one and the Walrasian one, and let us take particular values for the parameters, a = 2, b = c = 1. The bimatrix of relative payoffs is
Let us denote by θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ϕ 3 , ϕ 4 ) the probabilities with which the strategies are played by player 1 (player 2). The Nash equilibria of this game are given by Strategy (q N , p N ) is never played in an equilibrium while the limit stationary distribution of the imitation and experimentation dynamic places a non-zero weight on it. Therefore, in this game the set of long-run outcomes of the imitation and experimentation dynamic is larger than the support of Nash equilibria of a game where absolute payoffs are replaced by relative payoffs. This shows that it is not generally true that a long-run outcome of the dynamic is a Nash equilibrium of the relative payoffs game.
A symmetric two-player relative payoff normal form game, being zerosum, can have only one strict pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium. To see this, let (s i , s i ) be a strict equilibrium. Then u(s i , s i ) = 0 > u(s j , s i ) ∀s j = s i . But then, since the game is zero-sum, u(s i , s j ) = −u(s j , s i ) > 0 = u(s j , s j ), and (s j , s j ) is not a Nash equilibrium. The unique strict symmetric Nash equilibrium is also the unique locally stable component: after one mutation from (s i , s i ) to (s j , s i ) imitation would lead back to (s i , s i ), and from any state (s j , s j ) one mutation to (s i , s j ) would lead to (s i , s i ), away from (s j , s j ). Thus, from Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) , the unique strict Nash equilibrium is the unique stochastically stable state. In this case, imitation and relative payoff maximization agree. If a state is not a strict Nash equilibrium, one mutation is enough to leave it and move to another state. Then the two states belong to a mutation-connected component, and have to be either both among the stochastically stable states, or neither. The example shows that if there is no strict Nash equilibrium of the relative payoff game, imitation and relative payoff maximization do not always agree.
Remark 2 In two-player symmetric normal form games, if the relative payoff game has a unique strict Nash equilibrium, it is the unique stochastically stable state of the imitation dynamic. If the relative payoff game does not have a unique strict Nash equilibrium, the set of stochastically stable states and the support of Nash equilibria of the relative payoff game may differ.
Note that in the game of this section, the imperfect imitation in the twostage game leads to perfect imitation in a normal form game. The relative payoff transformation of this normal form game does not have a unique strict Nash equilibrium. The quantities and prices corresponding to the Cournot equilibrium then also lie in the set of stochastically stable states. Imperfect imitation, in distinction from perfect imitation, may lead to the outcome corresponding to the Cournot equilibrium. In this outcome firms earn higher profits than in the competitive outcome, thus imperfection in imitation improves efficiency.
Conclusion
This paper considered models of imitation in games that have an oligopoly structure. Though the results are inefficient for perfect imitation, imitative behavior is not as unattractive as it may seem: taken with care, it produces plausible results. Actually, one of the most celebrated strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma, "tit-for-tat", can be interpreted as imitation of what the other player did in the previous period (though it does not take into account the payoff). Applied with care, that is starting from cooperation, "tit-for-tat" "solves" the dilemma. Therefore, imitative behavior should not be rejected without considering the game at hand.
Indeed, in the paper we demonstrated that introducing imperfections into the imitation process may lead to the Cournot equilibrium as a possible long run outcome. The result is surprising since imperfection reduces the information available to the players. This shows that "as if" rational behavior can be achieved by a decrease in rationality (using less information). Alós-Ferrer (2001) obtains a similar result by an increase in rationality (allowing players to use more information from previous periods).
The model of imitation presented here is applicable only to symmetric games. Still, asymmetric games might be considered. For example, in a situation where there are asymmetries in information, a less informed agent (firm) may find it profitable to imitate a more informed agent (firm). Such situations are not considered in this paper but the ones that are considered show that imitation does not necessarily lead to bad results.
A Proof of Proposition 2
The technique to work with the notion of stochastic stability was introduced to the evolutionary game theory by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) . Here we use some results on stochastic stability from Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) .
Let P 0 be a finite Markov chain on the state space Z. Then P 0 zz denotes the probability of transition from z to z . A set {P ε } of perturbed processes is regular if ∀ε ∈ (0, ε * ] P ε is irreducible, ∀z, z ∈ Z lim ε→0 P ε zz = P 0 zz , and if P ε zz > 0 then ∃r(z, z ) ∈ R such that 0 < lim ε→0 P ε zz ε r(z,z ) < ∞. Each P ε has a unique stationary distribution µ ε . A state z is stochastically stable if lim ε→0 µ ε (z) > 0. This limit exists (see Young, 1993 ).
The set of states E is absorbing if P 0 zz = 0 ∀z ∈ E, z / ∈ E, and no proper subset of E has this property. The basin of attraction of an absorbing set is the set B(E) = {z : ∃m, ∃z ∈ E such that (P 0 ) m zz > 0}. States z and z are adjacent if one experimentation can change the state from z to z . The single-experimentation neighborhood M (Q) of an absorbing set Q is the set of all z that are adjacent to some z ∈ Q. A set of absorbing sets Φ is a cycle if ∀Q, A corollary from this proposition is that if there is a unique locally stable component, all states in it are stochastically stable, and these are the only stochastically stable states.
The proof of Proposition 2 will be based on two lemmas. Recall that the demand function is denoted by D(p) and the inverse demand function is denoted by P (Q). Though the state is specified by the strategies of both firms ((q 1 , p 1 ), (q 2 , p 2 )), the state where both firms play the same strategy (q, p) is denoted simply by (q, p). Recall that the grids are chosen is such a way that ∀q the price grid contains p = P (2q), and ∀p the capacity grid contains q =
one experimentation is needed to arrive at (
, the firms oversupply the market, that is, they both sell actually only
, it has the same revenue but a lower cost, and, therefore, a higher profit. The other firm follows.
one experimentation is needed to arrive at (q, P (2q)).
. If firm i increases price to P (2q), its demand is still q as well as the demand of the other firm. Therefore, the revenue of the deviating firm is higher, while the cost is the same. The other firm imitates.
We are ready for the main proof. Proof of Proposition 2. Let P 0 be the imitation process without experimentation. The set of perturbed processes is {P λ } where λ is the experimentation probability. The set is regular since the transition probabilities of the perturbed processes are polynomials in λ. By Remark 1 the absorbing sets of P 0 are states where both firms play the same combination of capacities and prices (p, q). We will show that there is a unique locally stable component containing (p N , q N ). First, consider an arbitrary (q, p) with q =
by Lemma 1 we can arrive at the curve q = . First consider q < q N . Suppose one firm deviates to (q N , p N ). Since p N < p and q N < D(p N ) the deviating firm sells q N and has a positive profit since it receives the profit equal to the profit in the Nash equilibrium. If q N ≥ 2q, the remaining firm does not sell anything, thus having zero revenue and nonpositive profit. Therefore, the remaining firm will follow the deviation. If q N < 2q, the remaining firm sells the residual demand q = 2q − q N < q at price p = P (2q) = P (q + q N ), still producing q. By the definition of the Nash equilibrium P (2q N )q N − C(q N ) ≥ P (q + q N )q − C(q ). The left hand side expression is the profit of the deviating firm, the right hand side is the profit of the remaining firm if it would have capacity q ; since q > q the profit of the remaining firm is even smaller. Thus, the profit of the deviating firm is higher than the remaining firm and with one experimentation we have arrived to the Nash equilibrium.
Consider now an arbitrary (q, p) such that q ≥ q N and q = D(p) 2 (or, equivalently, p = P (2q)). Suppose one firm deviates to the next available point on the grid and on the curve q =
, that is, the deviating firm plays (q + δ q , P (2(q + δ q )). Since the deviating firm has lower price, it sells all its capacity and its profit is (q + δ q )P (2q + 2δ q ) − C(q + δ q ). The remaining firm sells only D(P (2q)) − (q + δ q ) = q − δ q > 0 since δ q can be chosen to be smaller than q N . The profit of the remaining firm is then (q − δ q )P (2q) − C(q). The difference in profits between the deviating and the remaining firm is (2P (2q) + 2qP (2q) − C (q))δ q + O(δ 2 q ). By choosing an appropriately small δ , ∀δ q ≤ δ the sign of this expression is determined by the sign of 2P (2q) + 2qP (2q) − C (q).
Let F (q) := 2P (2q)+2qP (2q)−C (q). Then F (q) = 6P (2q)+4qP (2q)− C (q). Since P (q) is decreasing and concave, the first two terms are negative, and since C(q) is convex, the last term is also negative. Therefore, F (q) < 0. Then F (q) is decreasing and there exists a uniqueq such that F (q) = 0, ∀q <q F (q) > 0, and ∀q >q F (q) < 0. This means that along the curve q = D(p) 2
, ∃q such that ∀q <q a deviation to q + δ q gets imitated, and ∀q >q a deviation to q − δ q gets imitated. The process can arrive to (q, P (2q)) by unilateral experimentations along q = D(p) 2 . We have shown above thatq cannot be smaller than q N since ∀q < q N , a firm at q N gets higher profit. Therefore,q ≥ q N . Ifq = q N then we are done. Considerq > q N . Suppose the firms are at (q, P (2q)). Consider now that one firm experiments with (q N , P (q + q N )). The profit of the experimenting firm is π = q N P (q + q N ) − C(q N ), the profit of the other firm is π =qP (2q) − C(q). The difference π − π = q N P (q + q N ) − C(q N ) −qP (2q) + C(q) = q N P (2q N ) − C(q N ) + q N P (q + q N ) − q N P (2q N ) −qP (2q) + C(q). By the definition of Nash equilibrium π −π ≥qP (q+q N )+q N P (q+q N )−q N P (2q N )− qP (2q). From the assumptions on the inverse demand function it follows that P (q + q )q + 2P (q + q ) < 0, which implies that (P (q + q )q) < 0, or that P (q + q )q is concave for any q, q . The last fact implies that P (αq 1 + (1 − α)q 2 + q )(αq 1 + (1 − α)q 2 ) > αP (q 1 + q )q 1 + (1 − α)P (q 2 + q )q 2 ∀q 1 , q 2 , q ∀α ∈ (0, 1). Consider q 1 = 2q N , q 2 = 2q, q = 0, α = . Then we have (q + q N )P (q + q N ) > q N P (2q N ) +qP (2q), that is, π − π > 0. Therefore, a firm experimenting with (q N , P (q + q N )) gets a higher profit and gets imitated. If P (q + q N ) does not belong to the grid, the grid can be made finer until the point of the grid closest to P (q + q N ) brings a higher profit. Observe that making the grid finer does not changeq, the point to which the process can arrive along the curve q = D(p) 2 by one experimentation. Finally, from (q N , P (q + q N )), one arrives to (q N , P (2q N )) by one experimentation since P (q + q N ) < P (2q N ). We have seen that from any state, a sequence of experimentations, one at a time, leads to the state corresponding to the Cournot equilibrium. Thus the Cournot equilibrium belongs to the unique locally stable component and by Proposition 3 it is stochastically stable.
